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VU University Amsterdam, The Netherlands; 
Tilburg University, The Netherlands
1.  Introduction
On 13 September 2005, the Court of Justice of the European Communities (here-
after: Court of Justice EC) passed a judgment giving rise to much controversy.1 In 
that judgment, the Court found that in some situations, the EC Treaty leaves room 
to take measures in a directive “which relate to the criminal law of the Member 
States” (para. 48). The authority to take criminal law measures in the First Pillar 
exists – concisely stated – if these measures relate to one of the essential objec-
tives of the Community (cf. Articles 2 and 3 EC Treaty), and the use of effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties by the national authorities is an 
essential measure to achieve that objective.2
In view of the starting point that provisions of the EU Treaty may not prejudice 
those of the EC Treaty (Article 47 EU Treaty), actions of the Council within 
the Third Pillar – which concerns police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters as referred to in Article 29 ff. EU Treaty – may not encroach upon the 
competences of the Community in the First Pillar.3 This means that in cases 
1) Court of Justice EC 13 September 2005, case C-176/03, [2005] ECR I-7879.
2) The Court adds – also in para. 48 – that the Community legislature must consider the measures 
necessary, but that condition shows a certain overlap with the requirement of essentiality.
3) Art. 29, first lines, of the EU Treaty means, stated concisely, that the Union must lay down meas-
ures in relation to police and judicial cooperation “without prejudice to the powers of the European 
Community”. Cf. for the supervisory role of the Court of Justice EC in this connection, Court of 
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where the Community has the competence to take criminal law measures, such 
measures may not go beyond the First Pillar as its exclusive jurisdiction. Practically 
speaking, this means that such measures must be taken by means of a directive4 
and not a framework decision. Consequently, the legislative procedure designated 
in the EC Treaty has to be followed – usually the co-decision procedure in which 
decisions can be taken “only” by a qualified majority – and the Court of Justice 
EC can rule in an infringement action on the way in which the relevant directive 
is to be implemented, as well as give an interpretation of the rules of that directive 
in a preliminary ruling procedure.
The reason this judgment of 13 September 2005 caused so much controversy 
has everything to do with the characteristics of Community law and EU law re-
spectively, relating to police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Because, 
unlike in the First Pillar, decisions in the Third Pillar are taken on the basis of 
unanimity, while the Court of Justice EC plays a much less prominent role.5 Ac-
ceptance of the Community’s competence in the field of criminal law has therefore 
led to the objection among politicians as well as some legal scholars that “Europe” 
has now acquired too tight a grip on national criminal law. This in turn has resulted 
(in the Netherlands and elsewhere) in a hefty and not always constructive debate 
among the practitioners of the various legal disciplines over the desirability of 
Community intervention in national criminal law. It can be ascertained as well, 
even apart from the outcome, that the arguments by which the Court of Justice 
EC has assumed the Community’s competence in relation to criminal law have 
encountered substantial criticism.
In this paper, we do not want to repeat the debates already held.6 Instead, we 
focus on the issue of what the exact scope of the Community’s competence is in 
Justice EC 12 May 1998, Case C-170/96, [1998] ECR I-2763, para. 16 and the aforementioned judg-
ment of the Court of Justice EC of 13 September 2005, Case C-176/03, para. 39. See also para. 53 of 
the judgment of 23 October 2007 discussed below.
4) The adoption of a regulation is not ruled out either.
5) Cf. e.g. M.J. Borgers, “Implementing framework decisions”, Common Market Law Review (2007) 
1362-1371.
6) See regarding and further to the judgment in Case C-176/03: P.-Y. Monjal, “Reconnaisance 
d’une compétence pénale communautaire pour la CJCE”, Recueil Dalloz (2005) 3064-3067; K.M. 
Apps, “Case C-176/03, Commission v. Council: ‘Pillars Askew: Criminal Law EC-Style’”, Colum-
bia Journal of European Law (2006) 625-637; M.J. Borgers, “Harmonisatie van het strafrecht in de 
context van de Eerste Pijler”, Delikt en Delinkwent (2006) 76-99; M. Böse, “Die Zuständigkeit 
der Europäischen Gemeinschaft für das Strafrecht. Zugleich Besprechung von EuGH, Urteil vom 
13.9.2006”, Goltdammer’s Archiv für Strafrecht (2006) 211-224; P. De Hert, P. Paepe & H. Griffioen, 
“Europees milieustrafrechtarrest. Minder ruimte voor nationale bevoegdheden”, Nieuw Juridisch 
Weekblad (2006) 482-495; D. Spinellis, “Judgement of 13 September 2005 (Case C-176/03, Com-
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the field of criminal law, on the basis of a more recent judgment of the Court of 
Justice EC on the Framework Decision to strengthen the criminal-law framework 
for the enforcement of the law against ship-source pollution, (Case C-440/05).7 
For this purpose, we give an outline below of the background and developments 
leading up to the last-mentioned judgment (section 2). We then summarise this 
judgment and give a survey of the main grounds of the Advocate General (section 
3). Afterwards, we give our commentary on the judgment (section 4), followed by 
some concluding remarks (section 5).
2.  The Background and Developments Leading up to the Judgment in Case 
C-440/05
Before going into more detail on the Commission’s interpretation of the judgment 
of 13 September 2005, we must mention that Community intervention in the 
imposition of penalties at Member-State level to enforce Community legislation 
was already at issue before the pillar structure was introduced. For instance, the 
Court of Justice EC ruled as early as in 1989 in the Greek maize judgment that 
where Community legislation does not specifically provide a penalty for infringe-
ment or refers for that purpose to national laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions, the Member States may be required to take all measures based on their 
general obligation under Article 10 EC to guarantee the effective application of 
Community law. In doing so, they must “ensure in particular that infringements 
of Community law are penalized under conditions, both procedural and substan-
tive, which are analogous to those applicable to infringements of national law of 
mission v. Council) annulling the Council Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA of 27 January 2003 
on the protection of the environment through criminal law”, European Constitutional Law Review 
(2006) 293-302; Ch. Tobler, “Case C-176/03, Commission v. Council, judgment of the Grand Cham-
ber of 13 September 2005, nyr”, Common Market Law Review (2006) 835-854; M.I. Veldt-Foglia, 
“Toch strafrecht in de Eerste Pijler!”, Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Europees Recht (2006) 29-34; J.A.E. 
Vervaele, “De Europese Gemeenschap en harmonisatie van de strafrechtelijke handhaving van het 
gemeenschapsbeleid”, Delikt & Delinkwent (2006) 637-668; S. White, “Harmonisation of criminal 
law under the first pillar”, European Law Review (2006) 81-92; E. Herlin-Karnell, “Commission v. 
Council: Some Reflections on Criminal Law in the First Pillar”, European Public Law (2007) 69-84. 
See also S. Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law (Oxford, OUP 2006) 390-397, House of Lords, 
European Union Committee, The Criminal Law Competence of the European Community, 2006, HL-
paper 227, and the contributions to Eucrim, the European Criminal Law Associations’ Forum 2006, 
issue 3-4.
7) See for other discussions of the judgment in Case C-440/04: A. Dawes & O. Lynskey, “The 
Ever-Longer Arm of EC Law: The Extension of Community Competence into the Field of Criminal 
Law”, Common Market Law Review (2008) 131-158, as well as O.F. Essens, “Commissie versus Raad: 
ronde 2”, Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Europees Recht (2008) 91-96.
382
Borgers and Kooijmans / European Journal of Crime,  
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 16 (2008) 379–395
a similar nature and importance and which … make the penalties effective, pro-
portionate and dissuasive”.8 Referring to the Greek maize judgment, the Court of 
Justice EC held in 1999 that the same applies where Community legislation does 
provide specific penalties for infringement, but does not give an exhaustive list of 
the penalties the Member States may impose.9 Against this background, it is not 
very surprising that in the judgment of 13 September 2005, the Court of Justice 
sets the requirements of effectiveness, proportionality and dissuasiveness cited in 
the introduction on the penalties imposed by the competent national authorities. 
What makes the latter judgment so special is the (explicit) acknowledgment that 
this can also concern criminal penalties.
Referring to the judgment of the Court of Justice EC of 13 September 2005, the 
Commission appealed on 8 December 2005 against the Council of the European 
Union in order to review the validity of the Framework Decision on ship-source 
pollution.10 The reason for this action can be found in a Communication by the 
Commission, defining its position, published just before that action.11 In this Com-
munication, the Commission states that the rules from the Framework Decision 
on ship-source pollution could have and should have been enacted on the basis 
of Article 80(2) of the EC Treaty. The reason the Commission brought a second 
case before the Court of Justice EC so quickly which affects the demarcation of 
the First and Third Pillars is most likely connected with the need felt by the Com-
mission for further clarification of the grounds of the Court of Justice EC on the 
following two points.
First, the question is the extent to which the Community can take criminal 
measures in view of the legal bases provided by the EC Treaty for mutual harmoni-
sation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States 
in different areas. In the judgment of 13 September 2005, the Court of Justice EC 
limited itself on this point to Article 175 EC Treaty, thereby ruling that – stated 
concisely – this provision gives an adequate legal basis for taking criminal measures 
in relation to the environment. In its Communication, the Commission stated that 
this judgment was not limited to protection of the environment and that criminal 
measures were possible in other areas as well. The Commission then pointed out 
various framework decisions which, in view of the legal bases in the EC Treaty, 
should be replaced by directives. Because of the time limit for appeal, it was only 
8) Court of Justice EC 21 September 1989, Case 68/88, [1989] ECR 2965.
9) Court of Justice EC 8 July 1999, Case C-186/98, [1999] ECR I-4883.
10) Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA of 12 July 2005 to strengthen the criminal-law framework 
for the enforcement of the law against ship-source pollution, OJEU 2005, L 255/164.
11) Communication from the Commission on the implications of the Court’s judgment of 13 Sep-
tember 2005 (Case C 176/03 Commission v. Council), COM(2005) 583 final of 23 November 2005. 
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possible for the Commission to have the validity reviewed of the Framework De-
cision on ship-source pollution.12 This case centres on the question whether rules 
pertaining to harmonisation for the purpose of combating ship-source pollution 
under criminal law can be part of the common transport policy of Title V of the 
EC Treaty. This specifically concerns the legal basis in Article 80(2) EC Treaty, under 
which “appropriate provisions may be laid down for sea and air transport”.
The second part on which the Commission wanted to obtain clarity is the 
meaning of the phrase “measures which relate to the criminal law of the Member 
States”.13 As we will determine forthwith, the Court of Justice EC does not provide 
much clarity in the judgment of 13 September 2005 as to what these measures can 
or may entail. In its Communication, the Commission gives a broad interpretation 
to that phrase. It supposedly relates to the definition of the constituent elements 
of offences, the type and level of the criminal penalties applicable and “other ele-
ments relating to criminal law”.14 It is clear that the Commission wants to keep all 
options open. In the action on the Framework Decision on ship-source pollution, 
this is expressed in the statement that, according to the Commission, practically 
all15 provisions of this Framework Directive can be considered as such measures. 
In addition to defining certain acts as offences, this concerns, inter alia, rules 
relating to the types of penalties, the level of the minimum custodial sentence, 
jurisdiction, coordination of prosecution and obligations of the Member States 
to notify information.
In this outline of the run-up to Case C-440/05, we will not deal further with 
the issue of the legal grounds.16 For a good understanding of the Commission’s 
position on the (broad) interpretation of “measures which relate to the criminal 
law of the Member States”, it is advisable to deal somewhat longer with what can 
be concluded in this regard from the judgment of the Court of Justice EC of 13 
September 2005. It is important to note that the legality of the provisions of the 
Framework Decision on the protection of the environment through criminal law 
relating to jurisdiction, surrender and (coordination of ) prosecution were not up 
for discussion in that action. The relevant provisions were not part of the appeal 
brought by the Commission.17
12) Cf. Article 230(5) EC Treaty and Article 35(6) EU Treaty.
13) Court of Justice EC 13 September 2005, Case C-176/03, para. 48.
14) COM(2005) 583 final, p. 4.
15) The Commission’s appeal does not affect Article 11 on the period for transposing the framework 
decision and Article 12 on its entry into force.
16) Cf. the survey by Dawes & Lynskey (2008), pp. 140-144.
17) Court of Justice EC 13 September 2005, Case C-176/03, para. 18.
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The fact that the Court of Justice EC did indeed pronounce the annulment 
of the entire Framework Decision has to do with the indivisibility of the Frame-
work Decision. Its illegality is assumed specifically in relation to the minimum 
rules pertaining to the constituent elements of offences – including the rules on 
participation, instigation and the liability of legal persons – and in relation to 
penalties, including the type of penalty.18 The Court of Justice EC thus seems to 
have sought a connection with the measures referred to in Article 31(1)(e) of the 
EU Treaty.19 In doing so, the Court appears to have departed from the opinion of 
Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer. His position entails that the Community 
can prescribe only that certain acts must carry criminal penalties (and must be 
criminalised as such), but that the discretion regarding the types of penalties rests 
with the Member States. It might be possible for the Member States to specify the 
types of penalties in the Third Pillar in more detail.
It is striking that in the case that resulted in the judgment of 13 September 2005, 
the Commission left out of its appeal the provisions from the Framework Decision 
on the protection of the environment through criminal law relating to jurisdiction, 
extradition and (coordination of ) prosecution, while almost immediately after this 
judgment, it appeared to be of the opinion that such subjects could indeed be 
considered as measures that could be adopted within the Community. That the 
Commission wants to give a broad interpretation to “measures which relate to the 
criminal law of the Member States” is evident in three ways.
First of all, it can be pointed out that in the aforementioned Communication, 
the Commission proposed that a substantial number of framework decisions be 
replaced by directives. The Commission seems to be in favour of total replace-
ment, as no mention is made of the fact that on some parts – such as jurisdiction 
et cetera – Community legislation is not possible.20
Secondly, the Commission’s appeal against the Framework Decision on ship-
source pollution is important. It is aimed, as already stated above, against virtually 
all provisions of the Framework Decision.
Thirdly, it can be pointed out that various proposals which the Commission has 
recently made for Community legislation contain diverse rules of criminal law. 
Those rules pertain to defining specific acts as offences, the types of the penalties, 
18) Court of Justice EC 13 September 2005, Case C-176/03, para. 51, in which reference is made to 
Articles 1 to 7 of the Framework Decision on environmental criminal law.
19) According to Art. 31(1), first lines and under e. EU Treaty, common action on judicial coopera-
tion in criminal matters shall relate to progressively adopting measures establishing minimum rules 
relating to the constituent elements of criminal acts and to penalties in the fields of organised crime, 
terrorism and illicit drug trafficking.
20) Cf. also Peers (2006), p. 397. 
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the level of the penalties, confiscation of the proceeds of crime, deploying Com-
munity investigation teams and not being allowed to consider criminal acts as 
offences only subject to prosecution on complaint.21
The broad interpretation that the Commission gives to “measures which relate to 
the criminal law of the Member States” seems to be based on a specific interpreta-
tion of the grounds of the Court of Justice EC in the judgment of 13 September 
2005. In its Communication, the Commission notes:
The Court makes no distinction according to the type of the criminal law measures. Its ap-
proach is functional. The basis on which the Community legislature may provide for measures 
of criminal law is the necessity to ensure that Community rules and regulations are complied 
with.22
In other words: in the Commission’s view, all criminal law measures can be al-
lowed, provided those measures are necessary with a view to achievement of one 
of the Community’s objectives. In line with this, the Commission establishes that 
the double-text mechanism (combinations of directives and framework decisions), 
which was previously not uncommon, is no longer necessary, because “the provi-
sions of criminal law required for the effective implementation of Community 
law” can and should be adopted on the basis of the EC Treaty.23
Questions can be raised regarding the Commission’s interpretation of the 
grounds of the Court of Justice EC in the judgment of 13 September 2005. Al-
though it is correct that the Court does not literally make a distinction according 
to the type of the criminal measure, it should be borne in mind that the Court 
ruled only on the rules of the Framework Decision on the protection of the en-
vironment through criminal law relating to the constituent elements of offences 
and to penalties. This is also expressed by the fact that the Court of Justice EC 
found that the measures which relate to the criminal law of the Member States 
21) The most varied on this issue is the amended proposal for a Directive on criminal measures 
aimed at ensuring the enforcement of intellectual property rights, COM(2006) 168 final. See also 
the proposal for a Directive amending Council Directive 91/477/EEC on control of the acquisition 
and possession of weapons, COM(2006) 93 final; the proposal for a Council Regulation setting up 
a Community regime for the control of exports of dual-use items and technology, COM(2006) 
829 final; the proposal for a Directive on the protection of the environment through criminal law, 
COM(2007) 51 final; the proposal for a Directive providing for sanctions against employers of il-
legally staying third-country nationals, COM(2007) 249 final.
22) COM(2005) 583 final, p. 3. In this context also European Parliament resolution on the con-
sequences of the judgment of the Court of 13 September 2005 (C-176/03 Commission v. Council), 
document P6_TA(2006)0260, para. 16.
23) COM(2005) 583 final, p. 4.
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could be allowed when “the application of effective, proportionate and dissuasive 
criminal penalties by the competent national authorities is an essential measure”.24 
Viewed in this light, it cannot be said that this judgment of the Court has already 
legitimised other types of measures. Doubts have arisen in the literature as well 
as to which measures related to the criminal law of the Member States must be 
considered as allowed.25
It is important as well that the question was raised of the extent to which the 
Community has the competence to prescribe the type of a criminal penalty. The 
Court of Justice EC determined that the rule from the Framework Decision 
on the protection of the environment through criminal law prescribing that in 
certain cases conduct is punishable by “penalties involving deprivation of liberty 
which can give rise to extradition” (Article 5(1)), is one of the articles which, on 
account of their aim and content, have as their main purpose the protection of 
the environment and could have been adopted on the basis of Article 175 EC. 
Proportionately, this Article 5(1) of the Framework Decision on the protection 
of the environment through criminal law is not a very detailed rule, which, for 
example, does not contain a determination of the minimum maximum duration 
of a custodial sentence, now common in Europe. It is not automatically evident 
from this that in the judgment of 13 September 2005, the Court of Justice EC 
wanted to consider every form of specification by the Community of the type of the 
criminal penalty possible.26 At the same time, various authors argue that it is in line 
with this judgment to consider a specification of the type of the criminal penalty 
possible if it must be considered necessary with a view to enforcing Community 
law.27 On the basis of the same arguments, other types of measures – relating to 
jurisdiction28 and prosecution policy29 – are considered possible. In short: there are 
some doubts in the literature regarding the scope of the Community’s competence 
in the field of criminal law.
24) Court of Justice EC 13 September 2005, Case C-176/03, para. 48 (italics added).
25) Cf. e.g. Spinellis (2006), pp. 300-301, Veldt-Foglia (2006), p. 33, White (2006), p. 91, and the 
survey of opinions in House of Lords (2006), pp. 20-23.
26) See Peers (2006), p. 396. He points out para. 49 in Court of Justice EC 13 September 2005, Case 
C-176/03, in which the Court emphasises that the Framework Decision on the protection of the 
environment through criminal law leaves the choice of the criminal penalties to the Member States 
to a certain extent. Cf. also Barents (2006), p. 371, Tobler (2006), p. 847, and Mok in his case note 
under Court of Justice EC 23 October 2007, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie (2008) 48, under 1. 
27) Barents (2006), p. 371, Peers (2006), p. 396, and Tobler (2006), p. 849. This necessity criterion 
is expressed at the end of para. 48 in Court of Justice EC 13 September 2005, Case C-176/03.
28) Barents (2006), p. 371, and Peers (2006), 397.
29) Barents (2006), p. 371. 
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With this state of affairs, it should be clear that further clarification of the scope 
of the Community’s authority in the field of criminal law is desired in the action 
brought by the Commission against the Framework Decision on ship-source pol-
lution. It was presumed that such clarity could be created in the judgment in Case 
C-440/05. We therefore summarise this judgment here.
3. The Opinion of the Advocate-General and the Decision of the Court of 
Justice EC 
3.1. Introduction
The judgment of the Court of Justice EC is linked to an extensive and interesting 
opinion by Advocate General Mazák (hereafter: the AG). To be able to assess the 
judgment of the Court on its merits, it is advisable to view it in the light of the 
AG’s opinion. For this reason, we deal with the latter’s main grounds and discuss 
the grounds and decision of the Court of Justice EC in connection therewith.
3.2. Does the Competence of the Community in the Field of Criminal Law Only 
Extend to Protection of the Environment?
In the first place, the AG deals with the question whether the Community’s 
competence in the field of criminal law, as accepted in the judgment of the Court 
of Justice EC of 13 September 2005, only relates to the Community objective of 
environmental protection, or whether it is not a priori restricted to this.30 The 
AG takes the position that, although the circumstance that in the judgment of 13 
September 2005 reference is frequently made to the protection of the environment 
and its place in the EC Treaty can be taken to mean that the Court of Justice EC 
had only the specific area of the environment in mind, it does not necessarily fol-
low from this that the power to provide for criminal measures is restricted to the 
protection of the environment.
Notwithstanding the fact that the protection of the environment is of vital 
importance worldwide, environmental protection – as is evident from the ob-
jectives and activities referred to in Articles 2 and 3 EC Treaty – is not the only 
essential objective or policy area of the Community. As criminal law functions 
“as a barometer of the importance attached by a community to a legal good or 
value”, an exclusive link of the Community’s competence in the field of criminal 
law to environmental protection would not do justice to the nature – or, in the 
AG’s terms, the identity – of the Community. Another important argument put 
30) Points 91-99 of the opinion.
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forward by the AG concerns the effectiveness of Community law. This effective-
ness is the basis of the Community’s competence in the field of criminal law. As 
this concerns a general principle of Community law, for that reason as well, it is 
not logical to make an exclusive link. 
Regarding this first point of the Court of Justice EC summarises the case law in 
which, concisely stated, it is ruled that in the cases in which the Community has 
the competence to take criminal measures, it may not go beyond the First Pillar as 
its exclusive jurisdiction.31 Next, the Court of Justice EC holds in a rather general 
sense that the common transport policy “is one of the foundations of the Com-
munity”. In doing so, the Court of Justice EC makes a link on the basis of Article 
6 EC Treaty between environmental protection on the one hand and the common 
transport policy on the other.32 Environmental protection must also be considered 
as an objective of the common transport policy. Reasoning in this way, the Court 
of Justice EC establishes in so many words that the area covered by the Framework 
Decision on ship-source pollution is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the First 
Pillar. Unlike the AG, the Court of Justice EC does not hold in express terms that 
the competence of the Community in the field of criminal law is not exclusively 
linked to protection of the environment and that such competence therefore in 
principle relates to the various policy areas referred to in the EC Treaty.33
In a certain sense, the Court’s grounds are confusing precisely because an explicit 
link is made to the protection of the environment in para. 60. In our opinion, 
however, the Court of Justice EC did not mean to say that the Community has 
the competence to take criminal intervention measures only if the relevant policy 
area is also coloured by environmental protection requirements. This turn of 
phrase seems to be intended only for the purpose of determining that measures 
to combat ship-source pollution can be taken on the basis of Art. 80(2) of the EC 
Treaty, which pertains to the common transport policy.34 Although at first sight, 
environmental protection and transport policy seem to have little to do with each 
other, the Court of Justice wanted to express precisely that these policy are as closely 
connected on the basis of Art. 6 EC Treaty.35 Viewed in this light, the judgment 
31) Paras 52-60.
32) Art. 6 EC Treaty: “Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition 
and implementation of the Community policies and activities referred to in Article 3, in particular 
with a view to promoting sustainable development.”
33) Criticism of the unclear argumentation of the Court of Justice EC can also be found in Dawes 
& Lynskey (2008), pp. 143-144. Cf. also Essens (2008), pp. 93-94.
34) Art. 80(2) EC Treaty is cited as a legal basis in the preamble of Directive 2005/35/EC on ship-
source pollution and on the introduction of penalties for infringements, OJEU 2005, L 255/11.
35) See also points 126-129 of the opinion.
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of the Court of Justice EC is in line with the arguments of its AG. This means 
that the competence of the Community in the field of criminal law may therefore 
extend to all essential policy areas referred to in the EC Treaty.
3.3. The Specific Scope of the Competence to Lay Down Measures Related to the 
Criminal Law of the Member States
The question then arises regarding the specific scope of the competence to lay down 
measures which are related to the criminal law of the Member States.36 Together 
with AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in his opinion on the judgment of 13 September 
2005, AG Mázak is of the opinion that the Community legislature may require the 
Member States to impose criminal penalties and may prescribe that these penalties 
must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive, but does not have the power to 
specify the penalties to be imposed. This opinion is based on a clear view which 
essentially concerns a demarcation of powers between the Community and the 
Member States. The AG notes in this regard:
It must be borne in mind that the issue here is not a possible power on the part of the Com-
munity to impose criminal penalties itself, but rather the power to require the Member States 
to provide, within their respective penal systems, for certain forms of conduct to be classed as 
criminal offences as a means of upholding the Community legal order. Clearly, therefore, that 
raises not only concerns as to the internal consistency of the criminal law of the Union (…) 
but also as to the coherence of each national penal system.
In this context, not only the diverse opinions existing among the Member States 
on the position that criminal law takes as an enforcement instrument play a part. 
The AG emphasises that community rules on the type and level of the penalties 
to be imposed affect the coherence of the criminal law systems of the Member 
States. This is connected with the fact that the Community’s competence in relation 
to criminal law exists “only” in specific policy areas referred to in the EC Treaty 
and that, consequently, more than a partial harmonisation of national criminal 
legislation can never be effected. At national level, this can result in fragmenta-
tion because differences will exist or arise between the harmonised and nationally 
determined parts of criminal legislation.
Relying on the subsidiarity principle, the AG is therefore of the opinion that 
the Member States can best judge themselves what form should be given to the 
prescribed (effective, proportionate and dissuasive) criminal penalties in their 
national law. On this point, the AG sees no obstacle in the fact that the Court 
of Justice EC ruled in the judgment of 13 September 2005 that the rule from the 
36) Points 100-113 of the opinion.
390
Borgers and Kooijmans / European Journal of Crime,  
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 16 (2008) 379–395
Framework Decision on the protection of the environment through criminal law 
which prescribes that in certain cases, conduct must be punishable by “penalties 
involving deprivation of liberty which can give rise to extradition” (Article 5(1)) 
falls within the scope of the Community’s competence in the field of criminal law. 
This ruling was allegedly not based on a specific examination by the Court of the 
validity of the rule in question. 
Against this background, the AG comes to the conclusion that the Frame-
work Directive on ship-source pollution – because of its indivisibility – may well 
be annulled in its entirety, but that this is based only on the provisions of the 
Framework Decision relating to the constituent elements of the offences, which 
prescribe that those offences must be punishable by effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive penalties.37 The Court of Justice comes to the same conclusion, but it 
cannot be determined whether the Court also endorses the underlying arguments 
of its AG. The Court of Justice EC establishes first of all that the rules in which the 
punishable acts are defined, and the related rules pertaining to the punishability 
of participation and instigation as well as the liability of legal persons fall within 
the Community’s sphere of competence and therefore cannot be laid down in a 
framework decision. This is different with respect to the rules relating to the type 
and level of the criminal penalties to be imposed. The Court of Justice EC rules 
concisely in this respect:
By contrast, and contrary to the submission of the Commission, the determination of the 
type and level of the criminal penalties to be applied does not fall within the Community’s 
sphere of competence.
Regarding the other provisions of the Framework Decision, which pertain inter 
alia to jurisdiction, notification of information and the designation of contact 
points, the Court of Justice EC refrains from giving an opinion. Because these 
provisions, like the provisions relating to the type and level of the penalties, are 
inextricably linked to the rules laid down in the Framework Decision in conflict 
with the Community’s competence, the Court of Justice EC annuls the Framework 
Decision on ship-source pollution in its entirety.38
37) Points 130-139 of the opinion. The – in the AG’s view – contested provisions are Articles 2, 3 and 
5, as well as parts of Art. 4(1) and Art. 6(1) of the Framework Decision on ship-source pollution.
38) The Commission has meanwhile made a proposal for a Directive amending Directive 2005/35/
EC on ship-source pollution and on the introduction of penalties for infringements. COM(2008) 
134 final.
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3.4. The Effectiveness of the Measures Problematicised
Before commenting on the opinion of the Court of Justice EC, we cannot allow 
part of the AG’s opinion to go unnoticed.39 In this part, “certain conceptual flaws” 
are indicated regarding the competence of the Community in relation to criminal 
law. That competence exists, as ruled in the judgment of 13 September 2005, when 
“the application of effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties by 
the competent national authorities is an essential measure” to achieve the relevant 
Community objective. In addition, the Community legislature must “consider 
[those measures] necessary in order to ensure that the rules which it lays down … 
are fully effective”.
In these two strongly overlapping requirements, the effectiveness of the measures 
taken is the central point. In his opinion, however, the AG puts forward some res-
ervations to the effect that it is difficult to determine whether prescribing criminal 
penalties is necessary to enforce Community law. He points out, for instance, that 
criminological debate continues over the cases and matters in which the application 
of criminal penalties is the most appropriate manner of enforcement. Although 
the AG acknowledges that the Court of Justice EC leaves the determination of 
that necessity mainly to the Community legislature, this does not affect the fact 
that the core of the Community’s competence in relation to criminal law is based 
on a subjective assessment of such necessity. 
Another conceptual problem identified by the AG is the fact that the competence 
of the Community to take criminal measures is accessory to the Community’s 
competence to take action in a certain area. As different legislative procedures 
apply to the various legal bases in the EC Treaty, there is no uniform procedure 
for determining criminal measures. The AG considers the absence of a specific 
legal basis in relation to the enforcement of Community law under criminal law a 
deficiency in that respect. In addition, the AG shows some doubt as to whether it 
is indeed desirable for the Community to pursue policy along those lines, which 
involves more than prescribing criminal sanctions. The AG apparently has in 
mind the importance of the inner coherence of the criminal law systems of the 
Member States.
4.  Commentary on the Judgment of the Court of Justice EC
The first question that arises on the basis of the judgment of the Court of Justice 
EC on the Framework Decision on ship-source pollution is whether the Court 
of Justice EC provided the clarity that the Commission intended to obtain. Or, 
39) Points 114-122 of the opinion.
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in other words: to what extent did the Court of Justice EC actually give further 
substance to the phrase “measures which relate to the criminal law of the Member 
States”? Beyond discussion is that the Court of Justice considers these measures to 
include at any rate prescribing acts that are to be made punishable. It is also clear 
that the criminal penalties to be imposed for those acts may not be specified by 
prescribing the type and level of those penalties. For the rest, the Court of Justice 
EC does not delimit in more detail the scope of the “measures which relate to the 
criminal law of the Member States”. A different interpretation of the judgment can 
be found in Mok, who assumes that the rules in Articles 7 to 12 of the Framework 
Directive on ship-source pollution, relating inter alia to jurisdiction, notification 
of information and the designation of contact points, fall within the sphere of 
competence of the Community in relation to criminal law.40
In our opinion, this interpretation is based on an incorrect reading of the judg-
ment. In para. 73, the Court of Justice EC states that “it is not necessary to rule 
on the question whether they [Articles 7-12; MJB/TK] fall within the sphere of 
competence of the Community legislature”. The phrase “that these articles are also 
inextricably linked to the provisions of the Framework Decision” that do fall within 
the sphere of competence of the Community serves only to enable annulment of 
the entire Framework Decision. This is also evident from the fact that the same 
inextricable link was expressed by the Court in relation to the rules of Articles 4 
and 6 of the Framework Decision, regarding the extent to which they relate to the 
types and level of the criminal penalties, explicitly do not fall within the scope of 
the Community’s competence in relation to criminal law. All in all, it can therefore 
be ascertained that the Court of Justice EC only provided a limited degree of the 
clarity on this point which the Commission had hoped to obtain.
The Court of Justice EC even seems to have mitigated its position with respect 
to the judgment of 13 September 2005 to the extent it concerns the scope of the 
Community’s competence in the field of criminal law. It has already been indicated 
above that, in the last-mentioned judgment, the Court of Justice EC determined 
that the rule from the Framework Decision on the protection of the environment 
through criminal law, which prescribes inter alia that in certain cases, conduct must 
be punishable by “penalties involving deprivation of liberty which can give rise 
to extradition” falls within the scope of the Community’s competence in relation 
to criminal law. Together with AG Mazák, one may presume that this ruling was 
not based on a specific examination by the Court of the validity of that rule,41 but 
40) See his case note under Court of Justice EC 23 October 2007, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie (2008) 
48, under 2 (third paragraph). 
41) In that sense, see Dawes & Lynskey (2008), p. 139, and Essens (2008), p. 94.
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reading of the judgment of 13 September 2005 does not automatically necessitate 
this. The Court of Justice EC held in para. 49 of that judgment that the rules of 
the Framework Decision on the protection of the environment through criminal 
law “leave to the Member States the choice of the criminal penalties to apply, 
although, in accordance with Article 5(1) of the decision, the penalties must be 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive”.
Even though the Court of Justice EC apparently refers only to Article 5(1) of the 
Framework Decision on the protection of the environment through criminal law, 
in so far as it contains the requirement for Member States to provide for penalties 
that are effective, proportionate and dissuasive, the Court would not have failed 
to notice that the same provision also prescribes more specifically that in serious 
cases, those penalties must involve deprivation of liberty. If the Court of Justice 
EC had already considered such specification problematic at the time of the judg-
ment of 13 September 2005, it would have been logical for it to express this. It is 
then stated once again in para. 51 that “on account of both their aim and their 
content, Articles 1 to 7 of the framework decision” – thus also Article 5(1) – “have 
as their main purpose the protection of the environment and they could have been 
properly adopted on the basis of Article 175 EC”. This at least gives the impression 
that a certain degree of prescription of the type and level of the criminal penalties 
would be allowed if this must be considered necessary to enforce Community law. 
This gives the idea that a certain change of course did indeed take place in the 
judgment of 23 October 2007.
In another respect as well, it can be argued that the Court of Justice EC started to 
follow a different course. It is generally assumed that in the judgment of 13 Septem-
ber 2005, the Court was seeking to anticipate the European Constitution.42 Along 
those lines, the Court of Justice EC could once again have sought a connection 
with Article III-271(2) Constitution and its current counterpart, Article 69b(2), as 
included in the Treaty of Lisbon.43 In that case, prescription of the type and level 
of the criminal penalties could have fallen within the sphere of the Community’s 
42) Cf. inter alia Apps (2006), p. 631 (“a calculated attempt by the Court to flatten the pillar struc-
ture and introduce the institutional changes of the Constitution through the back door”), Borgers 
(2006), p. 99, De Hert, Paepe & Griffioen (2006), p. 495, House of Lords (2006), p. 17, and Dawes 
& Lynskey (2008), pp. 156-157.
43) OJEU 2007, C 306. Art. 69b(2) (can be found in OJEU 2007, C 306/65) reads: “If the ap-
proximation of criminal laws and regulations of the Member States proves essential to ensure the 
effective implementation of a Union policy in an area which has been subject to harmonisation 
measures, directives may establish minimum rules with regard to the definition of criminal offences 
and sanctions in the area concerned. Such directives shall be adopted by the same ordinary or special 
legislative procedure as was followed for the adoption of the harmonisation measures in question, 
without prejudice to Article 61 I.” 
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competence, provided such specification must be deemed necessary for the purpose 
of enforcing Community law. The Court of Justice EC could have substantiated 
this choice from the point of view, compelling in European law, of the effectiveness 
of Community law.
In line with that, the Court of Justice would also have had the possibility to 
assess the prescription of other types of criminal measures, such as rules relating to 
jurisdiction, in more detail in the light of the necessity of such measures. Instead 
of this, the Court of Justice EC now states resolutely that prescription of the type 
and level of criminal penalties is outside the competence of the Community, while 
no further definition is given either of the “measures which relate to the criminal 
law of the Member States”.
5.  Conclusion
We conclude that two explanations can be given for this changed attitude of the 
Court of Justice EC.
First of all, it is conceivable that the Court of Justice EC has been convinced 
by the opinion of AG Mazák, who put forward as the main argument against 
an extensive interpretation of the competence of the Community in relation to 
criminal law that with all the diversity of criminal law systems in Europe, it is not 
really possible to decide in detail at a central level the most appropriate penalty. 
Apart from the differences existing in the framing of prosecution policy, one must 
consider variations in the increasing degree of discretion given to criminal court 
judges in deciding on the sentencing in actual cases, as well as the ways of enforcing 
criminal penalties, for example where modalities of conditional or early release are 
concerned. In the light of the subsidiarity principle, this constitutes a strong argu-
ment. At the same time, one must ascertain that in the Third Pillar, the diversity 
of criminal law systems of the Member States is not considered as an obstacle to 
more detailed specification of criminal penalties, nor to laying down other types of 
rules of criminal law. The Member States apparently accept the fact that the effect 
of European rules can vary in the national criminal law systems.44
The second explanation is more political in nature. At the time the judgment of 
13 September 2005 was passed, it was still uncertain whether the European Con-
stitution would enter into effect in any form. At that time, the Court of Justice 
EC apparently wanted to contribute actively towards European approximation of 
criminal law. At the time the judgment on the Framework Decision on ship-source 
44) Which does not mean that no attention is paid to the pursuit of more uniformity. Cf. in this 
connection the Green Paper on the approximation, mutual recognition and enforcement of criminal 
sanctions in the European Union, COM(2004) 334 final.
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pollution was passed, however, the Treaty of Lisbon was almost ready. This Treaty 
all but abolishes the pillar structure, “European criminal law” is modelled (nearly) 
on Community law and a clearer demarcation is given of the competences in the 
field of criminal law. Consequently, for that reason, one could presume that the 
Court of Justice EC has chosen a low-profile version of the competence of the 
Community in the field of criminal law accepted in the judgment of 13 September 
2005. If this presumption is correct, we consider this a wise choice. An extensive 
interpretation of the competence of the Community in the field of criminal law 
would have resulted in too much discussion, and would not have been of much 
practical use either. With the entry into effect of the Treaty of Lisbon, which is 
foreseen on 1 January 2009, the competence of the Community in the field of 
criminal law will be governed by the then applicable provisions of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (being the successor to the EC Treaty), 
and the judgment of 13 September 2005, as well as that of 23 October 2007, will 
only have significance as legal history.
